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Abstract 
 
This paper reviews the existing literature on the property tax exemption for nonprofit 
organizations and identifies gaps to be addressed in future research. We start by 
examining justifications and existing eligibility criteria for the property tax exemption, 
followed by studies of the magnitude of the revenue loss from the exemption. We focus 
on theoretical and empirical studies of the economic effects of the exemption. We 
consider the effect of the tax advantage on nonprofit decisions about inputs, outputs and 
organizational form, decisions to rent or own, location decision, market share, and the 
effect of the exemption on neighboring property values. Finally, we evaluate research 
about the use of PILOTs and the implications of their possible expansion. We conclude 
that future studies need to examine further the magnitude of the revenues forgone, the 
advantages and disadvantages of PILOTs, and other solutions for distributing more 
evenly the burden of the exemption. Further studies are also needed to understand the 
economic effects of the property tax exemption, with opportunities for theoretical and 
empirical contributions.  
 
 
 
  
 
2
Introduction 
 
The special tax treatment of nonprofits has been the subject of a substantial amount of 
writing.  Empirical research on the effect of the tax treatment of contributions appears to 
far exceed the research on the analysis of the property tax exemption and the federal and 
state corporate income tax exemption.  In this chapter we explore what we know and 
don’t know about the property tax exemption.  In summary, we know very little.  There is 
very little theoretical work and even less empirical analysis of hypotheses regarding the 
effects of the property tax exemption.   
In 1988, Weisbrod (1988) wrote, “Only a little is known about the quantitative 
importance of the various [tax] subsidies that are provided to nonprofits.” While he was 
referring to the effect of tax subsidies on the size of the nonprofit sector, the statement 
was true for a broader range of issues.  Twenty years later it does not appear that we 
know much more than we did then.  
Much of what has been written about property tax exemptions focuses on the 
justification for the exemption. (See Rushton (Chapter 21 this book) for a discussion of 
the arguments for the exemption of nonprofits from corporate income taxes, the 
deduction of charitable donations from the personal income tax, and deduction of 
charitable gifts from the base of the estate tax.)  Historically, nonprofit organizations 
have been exempt because they provided public services together with or in place of the 
government. Brody (2002) refers to this as the “sovereignty” justification for nonprofit 
exemption. In colonial times there was no explicit distinction between public and private 
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provision of services as there is today, and the tax exemption of nonprofits was analogous 
to the tax treatment of other levels of government.   
Another justification for tax exemption is based on the “subsidy theory”. 
Hansmann (1987), for example, suggests that tax exemptions might be justified if there is 
a public policy reason to favor nonprofit firms, or if some market failure is addressed. 
This justification is the most economically compelling, but at the same time the approach 
to deliver the subsidy is questioned. There are no clear requirements about what is 
expected in return for this subsidy, just a general understanding that the exemption 
encourages activities that benefit the community. Also, this form of subsidy benefits 
organizations that own property, while smaller organizations and those that are more 
labor intensive are excluded. Furthermore, the burden of the property tax exemption falls 
on the local government, while the community benefits may be of much broader scope. 
These criticisms have been at the base of the current challenges to the property tax 
exemption.  
A third justification examines the property tax exemption within a tax base 
framework.   The main argument is that nonprofit property and income do not belong in 
the tax base.   Nonprofit income is used to produce public goods and services and 
therefore it should not be treated as taxable income.  The property tax exemption is 
harder to justify using the tax base approach because individual property not used for 
profit is also taxed.  However, if the property tax is viewed as a proxy for an income tax 
on the imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing, then nonprofit property does not 
belong in the tax base (Heller, 1979 referenced in Brody, 2002).  
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 The question of whether the tax exemption does result in organizational behavior, 
such as providing services free or at reduced cost to low-income households, that would 
justify the tax exemption is certainly of importance.  However, that topic is beyond the 
scope of our inquiry.   
 We start our discussion of the property tax exemption with a discussion of what 
we know about how the eligibility criteria for the property tax exemption differ across 
states and what we know about the magnitude of the tax benefit to nonprofits.  We then 
turn to a discussion of the potential effects of the property tax exemption on the behavior 
of nonprofit providers and on the market competition between for-profits and nonprofit 
firms.  In the final sections we consider efforts to remove the exemptions through legal 
action and through PILOTs (payments in lieu of taxes).  We also include a somewhat 
related discussion of the growing trend for local governments to provide additional 
subsidies to nonprofit firms in order to encourage them to locate within the jurisdiction.  
In essence, much of the research regarding differences in behavior between for-
profits and non-profits treat the tax exemption as a zero-one dummy variable.  This 
research simply compares the behavior or performance of nonprofit and for-profit firms.  
The difference in organizational form reflects the fact that nonprofits have tax 
exemptions.  Our focus is not on the literature that simply compares for-profit and 
nonprofit firms.  Rather, our focus is on how differences in the size of the tax exemptions 
affect behavior.  Since property taxes and corporate income taxes are both taxes on 
capital (the property tax is a tax on the value of capital while the corporate income tax is 
a tax on the return to capital), we also consider research that addresses the effect of the 
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corporate income tax exemption (but see Rushton (Chapter 21 of this book) for a more 
complete discussion of the deduction from the corporate income tax.)  
 
1. Eligibility Criteria for Property Tax Exemption 
 
States differ in the conditions that must be satisfied in order for a nonprofit organization 
to qualify for a property tax exemption.  Bowman (2002) provides the most recent survey 
of these conditions, which are summarized in Table 1.  These results synthesize 
provisions available in state constitutions and survey responses of state officials where 
the constitutions are not explicit about the particular criteria. Many of these criteria 
continue to undergo changes as exemptions are challenged by local governments and the 
courts develop more precise definitions and criteria for granting a property tax 
exemption.  
 Bowman finds that both ownership and use are necessary conditions to receive a 
property tax exemption.  Thirty-nine states grant a property tax exemption to property 
that is both owned by a nonprofit and used for a charitable purpose.  Only eleven states 
accept charitable use by itself as a sufficient condition for exemption, and no state would 
grant exemption just for nonprofit ownership.  The original condition for charitable use 
specified that the property should be used “exclusively” for the exempt purposes 
(Bowman, 2002).  However, this has changed over time to accommodate practices to 
lease some of the property to for-profit organizations, such as childcare centers in 
churches, gift-shops in hospitals, and other.  In thirty-one states nonprofit and for-profit 
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use is assessed separately, and taxes are paid only on the leased portion of the property 
used for profit.  Sixteen states do not have rules for separate assessment, and practices 
vary about the extent to which the nonprofit pays property taxes.  On the other hand, few 
nonprofits are exempt from property taxes when they rent space belonging to a for-profit 
entity.  Only seventeen states exempt such property.  
The definitions of nonprofit and charity used to determine eligibility for the 
property tax exemption vary widely across states and localities.  The survey by Bowman 
reveals that thirty-six states require that the organization should be incorporated as a 
nonprofit (501 (c) (3)).  However, nonprofit status is not a sufficient condition for 
property tax exemption.  Forty-five states expect that the nonprofit organization would 
serve a charitable purpose.  Charitable purpose is formally defined in only few states and 
the statutes provide diverse definitions about what constitutes charitable activity.  The 
main criteria identified by Bowman from those statutes are public benefit, relieving 
government of a burden, relief of poverty, and income from donations.  Using these 
criteria in his survey, Bowman finds that states use different combinations of these 
criteria as a way of identifying charitable purpose, as illustrated in the bottom half of 
Table 1.    
Given the variety of statutes and practices, Bowman’s study provides a good 
synthesis of the criteria used to determine eligibility for the property tax exemption.  
Another formidable task that remains is to understand how these criteria are applied in 
practice due to their vague definitions.  Generally, broadly defined eligibility criteria are 
interpreted in favor of nonprofits, particularly when exemption challenges are taken to 
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the courts.  But there is no information about any patterns across states or different 
nonprofit organizations.  
Second, as tax exemptions are challenged, there has been a move toward creating 
more specific requirements for each of the criteria, for example, defining charity care as a 
certain percentage spent on uncompensated care and community services by hospitals.  
Brody (2007) observes that lawsuits and legislation assert tighter definitions for 
exemption, establishing a widespread use of a “quid-pro-quo” rationale for granting 
exemption.  Nonprofits are under pressure to quantify even the value of the intangible 
benefits they claim to provide that have been used to justify the property tax exemption.  
Again, much of this information is based on prominent cases, such as Utah County v. 
Intermountain Health Care Inc., and the 1997 Institutions of Purely Public Charity Act in 
Pennsylvania, both setting very specific requirements to be met for tax exemption 
purposes (Gallagher, 2002).  The most comprehensive examination of legislative 
decisions on different challenges is presented in Brody (2007).   
Further research is necessary to document these modifications in the exemption 
criteria in order to improve our understanding of their implementation, as well as 
implications about the future of the property tax exemption. Another line of potential 
research would focus on explaining the variations in eligibility across states.  In addition, 
it would be of interest to determine how variations in eligibility criteria affect the number 
or magnitude of nonprofits that are eligible for a property tax exemption.  
 
2. Magnitude of the Revenue Loss from the Exemption 
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One can consider the property tax exemption as an implicit subsidy, or a tax expenditure, 
to nonprofits.  Instead of a property tax exemption, local governments could, at least in 
theory, provide direct subsidies to nonprofit organizations.1  Such direct subsidies would 
be determined through the budget process, and thus local governments would decide 
whether the size of the expenditure and the allocation across nonprofits were appropriate.  
For this reason, it would be desirable to know the value of this tax expenditure.   
Given that nonprofits are not uniformly distributed across jurisdictions, a second 
policy issue that arises is how the “cost” of the implicit subsidy is distributed across 
jurisdictions.  For example, universities benefit the entire state as well as out-of-state 
students, and some hospitals may benefit populations beyond the immediate locality, but 
the tax exemptions directly impact the local community.  Krueckeberg (2004) discusses 
the unequal distribution of the property tax burden in New Jersey, and finds that the 
majority of tax exempt property is concentrated in 10 municipalities characterized by low 
income, high exemptions, and high effective property taxes.  
There is no source that provides information about the value of the property tax 
exemption across all local governments.  Nor is there a source that provides an annual 
report of the value of the exemptions for each state.  Several factors peculiar to the nature 
of the property tax impede the estimation of the value of the exemption.  First, exempt 
property is not necessarily assessed on a regular basis or with the care given to other 
property because tax assessors do not have any incentive to put effort into regular 
                                                 
1 Local governments may not have legal authority to provide direct subsidies to nonprofit organizations.   
In some cases, such subsidies could be considered gifts or gratuities.   
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assessment of property that will not be paying taxes.  Lipman (2006a) reports that New 
York, Los Angeles, and San Diego spend equal effort on assessing taxable and exempt 
property, but that other big cities such as Chicago, Detroit, and San Antonio do not have 
sufficient staff to appraise exempt property.  Other cities fall somewhere in between. 
Second,, even if there are current property values for exempt nonprofits, it would still be 
necessary to apply property tax rates for each of the jurisdictions that would in the 
absence of the exemption levy a property tax on the property.  While this is feasible for 
the area in which the researcher lives, gathering such information across a wide range of 
jurisdiction would be difficult.      
There are periodic efforts to determine for specific jurisdiction the value of the 
property that is exempt.  Many of those efforts are concentrated on a single city, region, 
or less frequently a state.  For example, Lipman (2006b) reports the value of the property 
tax exemption for some of the biggest metropolitan areas.  New York loses $605 million 
annually and Boston $258 million from the property tax exemption of nonprofit 
organizations.  On the other hand, he estimates that Los Angeles loses only $81 million 
and San Francisco $42 million.   
Cordes, Gantz, and Pollak (2002) provide estimates of the value of the property 
tax exemption for eight states that collect such data.  The nonprofits in these states 
constitute about one-third of all nonprofits in the United States, and the total value of the 
exemption is estimated to be slightly higher than $3 billion (Cordes et al, 2002, p. 91).  
They also find that charities nationally, excluding houses of worship, held about $500 
billion worth of property in 1997.  With an average effective tax rate between 1.6 and 2.5 
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percent, they estimate that the value of the property tax exemption nationally falls 
between $8 and $13 billion for 1997 (p. 89).  
 Gentry and Penrod (2000) estimate the magnitude of the benefit of exemptions 
from capital taxes for nonprofit hospitals.  They find that the aggregate value of the 
property tax exemption in 1995 for nonprofit hospitals was $1.7 billion.  The value of the 
property tax exemption constituted 27 percent of total capital tax exemptions for 
nonprofit hospitals at all levels of government. Other estimates that we have come across 
are less informative because they consider only one local jurisdiction or only the value of 
property that can be subject to PILOTs. 
 In summary, little is known about the value of the property tax exemption and 
how the values of the exemption vary across jurisdictions.  The absence of such measures 
is due to the absence of data, and in particular because actual tax rates and assessed 
values are not available for many local governments.  First, collecting assessment data 
from each assessor is very time consuming.  Further, if assessments are not available, it 
would be necessary to develop a methodology to measure the real estate value of tax 
exempt organizations.  Second, any estimation of the forgone revenue will require a 
national database of effective tax rates.   
If such data limitations are overcome, scholars can look at the value of the tax 
exemption and how it compares to the benefits that nonprofit organizations provide.  Data 
about the forgone revenues from the property tax exemption can also be used by local 
governments to negotiate PILOT payments with nonprofit organizations.  And, such data 
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is necessary to study the effect of the property tax exemption on property ownership by 
nonprofits. 
  
3. Economic Effects of the Property Tax Exemption 
 
There are many possible economic effects that the property tax exemption might have on 
the behavior of nonprofits and on the “market” for the services provided by nonprofits  In 
this section, we consider several economic decisions or market outcomes that might be 
affected by the property tax exemption.  
Economic models of behavior assume purposeful behavior related to some goals such 
as profit or utility maximization.  The challenges in modeling nonprofit behavior are 
related to the specification of the goals of nonprofits and the availability of data to test 
hypotheses derived from the models.  There is not general agreement on what goals 
nonprofits seek or on how the nonprofit market achieves equilibrium.  (For a detailed 
discussion of nonprofit models, see Chapter 10.)  Furthermore, with a few exceptions tax 
exemptions have not been explicitly incorporated in the models of nonprofit behavior.  
We discuss extensions of the models that include the tax exemption, but they are based 
on economic assumptions about organizational behavior borrowed from for-profit 
organizations, and are subject to empirical verification.   
 
A. Use of the Financial Benefits of the Exemption 
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One of the issues regarding capital tax exemptions concerns how nonprofits use this cost 
advantage.  Steinberg (1991) lists three ways that nonprofits could apply the tax 
advantage.   His discussion was in the context of nonprofits competing with for-profit 
firms, but the points apply to markets in which there are no for-profit firms, a situation 
that could be the result of the tax advantages enjoyed by nonprofits. Nonprofits could 
provide additional or higher quality goods and services or increase the quality of existing 
services.  They could use the funds from the tax exemption to subsidize the price, and 
thus increase the quantity demanded.  Second, nonprofits could use the tax exemption to 
provide goods that generate positive externalities.  For example, Steinberg suggests that a 
nonprofit could provide excess capacity, for example more beds in a hospital, or provide 
price subsidies to low-income households.  Third, nonprofits could use the benefits from 
the tax exemption to enable the nonprofit to use higher-cost production techniques, for 
example through managerial inattention or employee benefits.   
It appears that there is some effort at trying to compare the costs of and the nature 
of the services provided by nonprofits to those of for-profit firms, particularly for 
hospitals, (see, for example, Hassett and Hubbard 1999; Norton and Staiger 1994; Sloan 
et al 2001; Kessler and McClellan 2002; Rose-Ackerman 1996)).  But these studies focus 
on the effects of organizational form, i.e., nonprofit versus for profit.  There are no efforts 
that we could identify to determine whether the magnitude of the tax exemption affects 
the cost structure or the nature of the services provided by nonprofits.  No one has 
attempted to determine, for example, whether the differences between for-profit and 
nonprofit organizations in their cost structures, the nature of services they provide, or the 
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types of clients they serve are smaller in communities with very low property tax rates or 
states with no corporate income tax. Or as Colombo (2006) asks in reviewing the Federal 
Trade Commission and Department of Justice 2004 report on competition in health care, 
“Is tax exemption, for example, ‘buying’ charity care for the poor, and would withdrawal 
of exemption negatively impact health care for the uninsured poor?” 
 
B. Decision to Own versus Rent 
 
In most states property is exempted from property taxes only if it is owned by the 
nonprofit and is used for purposes that make it eligible for a property tax exemption. 
Given that the property tax exemption reduces the cost of owning a building, it would be 
expected that the exemption would influence a nonprofit’s decision to own versus rent 
space, assuming that nonprofits made such a decision based on economic grounds, i.e., a 
desire to minimize costs.  Cordes, Gantz, and Pollak (2002) present the theory behind 
such a decision.  The rental or user cost per dollar for a for-profit landlord is given by the 
following equation 
 
 c/q = r + δ(1-tα)/(1-t) + τ 
 
where c is the gross market rent charged per dollar invested, q is the value of the 
property, r is the before tax cost of capital, δ is the economic depreciation rate, t is the tax 
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rate, α is the percent of depreciation that can be claimed for income tax purposes, and τ is 
the property tax rate. 
 If the nonprofit owned the building then  
 
 c*/q = r + δ 
 
It would be better to own than rent if c/q – c*/q > 0, or if 
 
 τ – δt(α-1)/(1-t) > 0 
 
If α = 1, i.e., tax depreciation was equal to economic depreciation, then the nonprofit 
would save by owning.  But as α increases, the second term gets larger. Thus, if for-profit 
firms are allowed significantly accelerated depreciation, i.e., if α is very large, then the 
nonprofit would be better off renting.  When α is very large, the depreciation allowance 
provides a substantial tax subsidy to the for-profit landlord.  When the federal 
government in the early 1980s adopted accelerated depreciation for buildings, there were 
examples of nonprofit organizations selling buildings to for-profit firms and then leasing 
the building back.   
 As best we can determine, there are no papers that have investigated whether the 
size of the property tax exemption increased the likelihood that a nonprofit will own 
rather than rent.  There are challenges to conducting such a study.  First, the decision of a 
nonprofit to own may be driven by considerations other than cost minimization.  For 
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example, it may be feasible to successfully conduct a capital drive to build or buy a 
building while generating contribution to cover overhead such as rent may be more 
difficult.  Thus, a nonprofit may decide to own even when it is not consistent with cost 
minimization.  Second, to conduct such a study requires consideration of nonprofits that 
face different tax rates, i.e., the sample must contain nonprofits from multiple 
jurisdictions.  Third, it would be necessary to gather data to control for other factors that 
might affect the decision to own rather than rent. 
 
C. Location Decision 
 
The property tax exemption should eliminate the property tax as a consideration in the 
location decision of nonprofit organizations that own their own building.  Thus, for 
example, the property tax exemption would make the location in downtown areas more 
affordable for nonprofits that own property.  On the other hand, nonprofit organizations 
that rent face the same rental rates as for-profit organizations, unless there is a different 
assessment of property leased to nonprofit organizations.   
Nonprofit location theory has not considered the property tax exemption, but has 
focused on other factors that determine the location choice of nonprofit organizations.  
For example, Wolpert, Naphtali, and Seley (2001) study the spatial patterns of nonprofit 
location in New York.  Among those nonprofits, the type and scale of services provided 
by the organization requires that some nonprofits are located in a central location, such as 
museums and arts organizations, while hospitals and daycare centers may be more 
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dispersed.   Also, nonprofits that benefit particular populations, such as homeless shelters, 
soup kitchens, and job training centers, would be located close to them to ensure proper 
service access.  Other nonprofit organizations may prefer to be located together with 
other similar organizations to benefit from economies of agglomeration and a common 
pool of skilled labor force.  Habitat for Humanity moved its headquarters to Atlanta for 
similar reasons.  Finally, nonprofit organizations that have been established for a long 
time tend to be located in the central parts of the city.  In that aspect, the property tax 
exemption is keeping their current location more affordable regardless of changes in 
property values, at least in terms of out-of-pocket cost; nonprofits would still face the 
opportunity cost of owning expensive land.  But perhaps nonprofits do not consider such 
opportunity costs in making these location decisions. 
Bielefeld and Murdoch (2004) compare the location patterns of nonprofit and for-
profit providers of education and human services in six metropolitan areas.  They find 
that similar nonprofits were clustered and their location was best explained by the needs 
and resources of the community.  Additionally, some nonprofits were located in 
proximity to similar nonprofits or similar for-profits, indicating agglomeration factors.  
 In addition to the intra-metropolitan location decision, nonprofits also make inter-
metropolitan or inter-state location decision.  There are substantial differences in the 
number of nonprofits per capita across the country (Weisbrod, 1988).  Nonprofits are 
usually concentrated in major cities, but some smaller cities may also have a 
disproportionate number of nonprofit organizations relative to their tax bases.   Gentry 
and Penrod (2000) find that the distribution of nonprofit hospitals varies widely across 
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the United States.  Nonprofit hospitals dominate in the Northeast, where there are almost 
no for-profit hospitals.  About half of the for-profit hospitals are concentrated in three 
states: Texas, Florida, and California.  But neither they nor anyone else that we could 
determine have considered the extent to which the location pattern is due to differences in 
property and state corporate income tax exemptions, or even if the spatial pattern is a 
result of location decisions rather than a decision regarding organization form, nonprofit 
versus for-profit. 
There is a literature that considers the optimal location of public service sites (see for 
example, White (1979).  This literature might be the basis for a theory of the optimal 
location of nonprofit sites in the presence of property tax exemptions.  Such a theory 
would be necessary in order to specify any empirical work other than some ad hoc 
empirical model of location. 
 
D. Capital-Labor Ratio, Capital-Land Ratio, and the Size of Operation 
 
For for-profit firms, it would be expected that exemption from taxes on capital, such as 
the federal and state corporate income taxes and property taxes, would increase the ratio 
of capital to labor used in production because the cost of capital would be reduced, and 
would increase the level of output since average costs would be lower.  But we have not 
found any theoretical models of nonprofit behavior that consider these issues.  Whether 
we would find such an effect for a nonprofit organization would likely depend on the 
organization’s behavioral objectives.  For example, consider Newhouse’s (1970) 
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economic model of a hospital.  In his model the decision maker maximizes utility, which 
is a function of the quantity of services provided and the quality of those services. Such a 
hospital could choose to provide higher quality services than would a for-profit hospital.  
If higher quality is associated with higher labor per unit of output, then the nonprofit 
hospital will have a lower capital labor ratio and less output than a for-profit hospital.   
 Various authors have compared the size of for-profit hospitals to the size of 
nonprofit hospitals.  Gentry and Penrod (2000), for example, report that in 1995, while 59 
percent of short-term hospitals were nonprofit, they accounted for 70 percent of the beds.  
In part, this is because nonprofits include some very large teaching hospitals.   
 Gentry and Penrod also provide data on the capital intensity of hospitals.  They 
report that at the median of their distributions nonprofit hospitals have higher total wages 
relative to fixed assets and lower capital costs relative to total cost than do for-profit 
hospitals.  This suggests that nonprofit hospitals are less capital intensive than for-profit 
hospitals.  This is consistent with the simple extension of Newhouse’s model presented 
above.  However, this result could also be due to the mix of the particular services 
provided by nonprofit hospitals as compared to for-profit hospitals.  Gentry and Penrod 
did not conduct an empirical investigation of the relationship between capital tax 
exemptions and capital intensity.   
David (2005) examines the dynamics of hospital convergence in size overtime 
between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals.  In 1960, nonprofit hospitals maintained on 
average three times as many beds per hospital as for-profit hospitals.  By 2000, the 
average nonprofit hospital was only 30 percent larger than a for-profit hospital.  The main 
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sources of convergence are:  1) different growth in scale by for-profit (5 percent) and 
nonprofit (2.3 percent) hospitals up to 1980s, and 2) negative growth by nonprofit 
hospitals due to the introduction of the Prospective Payment System (fixed 
reimbursement on the basis of the number of patients, not on reported costs) combined 
with positive (modest) growth of for-profit hospitals.  
 David (2005) models the factors that affect the ratio of nonprofit to for-profit 
hospitals and their size.  The decision to select one organizational form over the other 
depends on the cost advantages of nonprofit status (tax exemptions), and the non-
distribution constraint (profits should be invested in the charitable mission of the 
organization).  With the advantage of tax exemptions, nonprofit hospitals are expected to 
have higher output.  However, assuming that nonprofit owners can convert some of their 
cost advantage into perks, and that they have the same utility from perks as for-profit 
owners from profits, the output will depend on the ability of nonprofits to convert their 
cost advantage into perks.  The convergence in size depends on demographic factors, 
changes in cost advantages, and availability of government beds.  Nonprofit and for-
profit hospitals converge in size when the cost advantages of nonprofit hospitals 
decrease, when government beds decrease, and when demand for services increases 
(David, 2005, pp. 23-24).  
We were unable to find any study that considered the capital intensity of nonprofit 
organizations in non-hospital markets or any studies that investigated the effect of the tax 
exemption on the size of the organization.  To conduct good empirical research, it is 
  
 
20
necessary to have a theory of how the exemption from capital taxes will affect the 
capital-labor ratio and agency size.  In addition, obtaining adequate data is a challenge. 
Since the property tax applies to both land and capital, a property tax exemption 
should not affect the capital-land ratio.  But, we did not identify any study of the effect on 
the capital-land ratio.  Casual empiricism suggests that there are nonprofits such as some 
private colleges and universities and churches that have very large land holdings, 
contrary to the expectation of economic theory that the property tax exemption should not 
affect capital-land ratio.  It could be that the nonprofits are able to hold these lands 
because the property tax exemption eliminates any cash flow payment, or that for these 
nonprofits, land is a more important input than for other organizations. 
 
E. Nonprofit Share of the Market 
 
The property tax exemption is an implicit subsidy to nonprofit organizations that could 
increase the size of the nonprofit sector over what it would be in the absence of the 
exemption.  We are unaware of any research that has studied this effect.  However, in 
those markets that contain both nonprofit and for-profit organizations, the property tax 
exemption could be a factor that explains the nonprofit market share of that industry.  We 
have identified three papers that consider the effect of property taxes on nonprofit market 
share and three papers that consider the change in the form of organization over time.  
 Hansmann (1987) considered four markets: short-term hospitals, nursing homes, 
post-secondary vocational education and primary and secondary education.  Using 1975 
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data for the 50 states, he finds that the statewide weighted average effective property tax 
rate is positive for all four markets, but statistically significant at the 10 percent level or 
better only for post-secondary vocational education.  He also uses data for the largest city 
in each state, but obtains no statistically significant coefficients.  Nonprofit market share 
is measured as the number of beds for hospitals and nursing homes, enrollment for 
vocational schools, and number of nonprofit firms (excluding religious schools) for 
primary and secondary education.  He also includes the state corporate income tax rates.  
Since both the property tax and the corporate income tax are taxes on capital, one should 
expect similar effects for the two taxes.  However, the coefficients on the corporate tax 
rate are positive and, unlike the coefficients on the property tax rate, the coefficients on 
the state corporate income tax are generally significant.  
 Chang and Tuckman (1990) consider hospitals in Tennessee, using county level 
data for 1982-85.  Chang and Tuckman note that many counties have no hospital or only 
one hospital. They investigate whether the nonprofit share of the hospital market, as 
measured by patient days, increases with the effective property tax, but contrary to 
expectations, the coefficient is negative and significant.  They do find, as expected that 
higher property tax rate increases the probability that a county has only one hospital.   
Gulley and Santerre (1993) use a five-year increment panel (1967-1987) for all 50 
states plus DC to consider the effect of higher property taxes on the nonprofit market 
share of hospitals, measured by the number of beds.  Unlike Hansmann, and Chang and 
Tuckman, Gulley and Santerre consider government hospitals as well.  The other two 
papers treat government hospitals as fixed in supply, while Gulley and Santerre assume 
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the government share is endogenous.  Thus, they estimate three equations, with the 
dependent variables being the shares for the nonprofit, for-profit and government 
hospitals, incorporating the condition that the share must sum to one.  They find that the 
weighted statewide average effective property tax rate and the state corporate income tax 
rate have positive and statistically significant affect on the nonprofit market share.  The 
coefficients for the for-profit share equation are negative, as expected, but statistically 
significant only for the corporate income tax.  The elasticity of nonprofit market share 
with respect to the property tax rate is 0.041, which seems to be rather small.   
 We identified two papers that consider the effect of just the corporate income tax 
on nonprofit market share of hospitals.  Mullner and Hadley (1984) find that changes in 
state corporate income tax rates between 1972 and 1983 had no statistically significant 
effect on the change in for-profit market share.  Hu (2006) considers both national 35-
year time series data and longitudinal data (all 50 states plus DC for 1975-2000) to 
investigate the effect of the corporate income tax exemption on nonprofit share of the 
hospital market, measured separately by beds and admissions.  He finds that the larger the 
corporate income tax rate, the larger the nonprofit market share of the hospital market.   
Related to market share is the effect of the tax exemptions on the magnitude of 
the commercial activities of nonprofit organizations (see Chapter 21 for a discussion of 
unrelated business income tax).  Cordes and Weisbrod (1998) consider how the property 
tax and corporate income tax exemptions affect commercial activities.  As dependent 
variables they use commercial share measured as program service revenue as a share of 
total revenue and whether the nonprofit filed an unrelated business income tax (UBIT) 
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return.  The UBIT is a tax on revenues earned from activities not directly related to the 
charitable mission of the organization. They created two dummy variables, one for 
whether a state had high property taxes and one for whether the state had high corporate 
income taxes.  Using the 1992 public use sample of IRS Form-990 returns, they find that 
higher property taxes and higher corporate income taxes are associated with higher 
commercial share.  The probability of filing a UBIT return is positively related with 
higher corporate income taxes. 
 The share of the market held by nonprofits will depend on entry into and exit 
from the industry by nonprofit and for-profit firms, i.e., it will depend on market 
equilibrium.  Suppose that the market is competitive and nonprofit and for-profit firms 
take the price as given and pick the quantity to provide.  Since nonprofit firms have a cost 
advantage because of the tax exemption, their share of the market will increase, perhaps 
to 100 percent.  One can envision that market structures other than perfect competition 
and alternative nonprofit behavioral objectives would yield alternative market equilibria.   
 Additional empirical research on market share should be conducted, particularly 
for non-hospital markets.  However, attempting to measure market share for other 
services is a challenge.  Additional theoretical work is needed to explain market 
dynamics.  Furthermore, the empirical work has been focused on explaining existing 
market share, but empirical research also needs to consider the entry/exit process and 
how the magnitude of the tax exemption affects that process. 
 
F. Choice Between For-profit and Nonprofit Status 
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Clearly related to the nonprofit share of an industry is the effect of the property tax 
exemption on the decision to organize as a for-profit or a nonprofit firm.  There are some 
theoretical discussions of this choice.  Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) develop a model in 
which an entrepreneur chooses a nonprofit status as a means of committing to soft 
incentives.  They argue that tax exemptions are not relevant to this decision.  On the other 
hand, Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006) develop a model of organizational choice and 
derive equilibrium conditions, where the marginal firm determines how the industry is 
split between for-profit and nonprofit firms.  Within their model they show that an 
increase in the tax advantage of nonprofits (i.e., a reduction in the production cost of 
nonprofits) will increase the share of nonprofits in the industry.   
 
G. Property Value 
 
The property tax exemption combined with the fact that nonprofits use land within a 
jurisdiction, means that local governments obtain less revenue than they would from 
other uses of the property.  Does this loss of government revenue get capitalized into the 
value of property within the jurisdiction? 
 Theoretically, the effect of nonprofits on housing values is ambiguous.  On the 
one hand, more nonprofits would decrease the property tax base for the local government 
and it would have to increase taxes for residents, which would lower property values.  On 
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the other hand, the presence and services of a nonprofit organization may increase the 
appeal of the area, thereby raising property values.  
 There are a number of studies that have investigated the effect that specific 
nonprofits or types of nonprofits have on housing prices in the area surrounding the 
nonprofit.  For example, Bielefeld et al (2006) used a hedonic equation to determine the 
effect on housing prices of a nonprofit that was located within one mile of the house.  
Dummy variables for the number of different types of nonprofits in one-mile radius are 
used to capture the effect of their presence on housing prices.  Overall, the presence of a 
nonprofit within a one-mile radius increases the house sale price.  However, the effect 
varies by the type of nonprofit and the number of nonprofit organizations.  Arts, animal, 
and environmental nonprofits have initially negative and then positive effect as the 
number of organizations increases.  Health, religion and education nonprofits have a 
positive effect. Human services nonprofits have a negative effect at any number of 
organizations.  
 The findings by Bielefeld are in line with earlier studies.  Ottensmann (2000) 
examined the effect of church proximity on housing values and rent and found a 
significant positive effect.  Ellen and Voicu (2006) find that housing redevelopment by 
both nonprofit and for-profit organizations increased the value of neighboring houses.  
Nonprofits invested in more distressed areas and their impact remained stable over time, 
lending support to the idea that nonprofits are more committed to social services 
characterized by externalities than for-profits.   
  
 
26
However, these studies consider the effect on housing prices within one 
jurisdiction, for example Bielefeld et al (2006) used housing data for Indianapolis, 
Indiana.  Using data for one jurisdiction does not allow for variations in property tax rates 
due to differences in the importance of nonprofits.  To conduct a study to determine 
whether the property tax exemption was capitalized into house values would require a 
data set that would be very hard to construct.  In particular, it would be necessary to 
quantify for several jurisdictions the magnitude of the property tax revenue that would 
have to be replaced and the thus the necessary increase in the property tax rate.   
 
4. PILOTs and Efforts to Revoke Tax-Exempt Status 
 
The property tax provides a substantial portion of local government revenues.  However, 
its visibility has made it the most unpopular tax among tax payers.  A tax revolt starting 
with Proposition 13 in California has brought significant restrictions on the revenues that 
can be raised through property taxes.  Furthermore, local governments are facing other 
fiscal pressures such as cyclical variations in transfers from the federal and state 
government, and structural constraints due to rising wage and benefits obligations.  
Therefore, cash-strapped cities have looked for other revenue options. An option that has 
been subject to a lot of media attention are payments-in-lieu-of-taxes or PILOTs.  These 
are agreements between the local government and major nonprofit organizations on 
payments to compensate the local government for services provided to nonprofit 
organizations.  The tension associated with this practice is illustrated by the fact that 
  
 
27
governments refer to PILOTs as voluntary agreements, while nonprofits consider them 
essentially blackmail backed up by threats to revoke their property tax exemption.  
Arrangements for PILOTs have existed for many years but have been 
concentrated among a few cities with large universities such as Harvard, MIT, and 
Boston College.  However, the recent fiscal pressures have forced other governments to 
consider PILOTs, particularly for educational institutions and hospitals with sizeable 
endowments and property.  A study conducted for North Carolina nonprofits identifies 
the main factors increasing the probability for challenges to the tax exempt status of 
nonprofits (Anderson et al., 2003).  The first set of factors is related to the fiscal 
environment of the local government.  Large and frequent budget shortfalls, as well as a 
considerable concentration of nonprofit organizations within a locality are more likely to 
lead to challenges of the nonprofit tax exemption.  The second set of factors is related to 
the characteristics of the nonprofit organizations.  Nonprofits with large assets and land 
are more likely to be scrutinized for their exemption, as well as those competing with for-
profit companies and generating a significant amount of their revenues through service 
fees.  Barniv, Danvers, and Healy-Burress (2005) also consider the loss of property tax 
exemptions among nonprofit hospitals.  They find that the larger the tax base of a 
nonprofit hospital, the greater the likelihood of revoking the tax-exempt status.   
The most comprehensive study of the use of PILOTs so far is by Leland (2002), 
who surveyed the largest cities in the United States.  Only seven of the fifty-one large 
cities surveyed report that they collect PILOT payments from nonprofit organizations, 
ranging from as low as $260,000 in Minneapolis to $19,400,000 in Boston (Leland, 2002, 
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p. 202).  As a percentage of the annual city budget, these revenues range between 0.03 
percent and 1.4 percent respectively.  While these findings indicate that among large 
cities PILOTs are not a significant revenue choice, there is no such comprehensive 
information about the extent of PILOT programs in smaller cities.  Leland also finds that 
the main factors contributing to the introduction of PILOT programs are municipal 
revenue needs, nonprofit competition with for-profits, and large revenues from services.   
Brody (2007) also reports that PILOTs are sought from organizations that generate 
revenues from services and they can be interpreted as attempts to tax non-local 
beneficiaries of the services.   
We do not know whether and how challenges to the tax exemptions and PILOTs 
influence service levels, financial performance, or the location decisions of nonprofits.  
Nonprofits argue that any payments to local governments would divert much needed 
resources from the pursuit of their missions or would require additional fundraising to 
compensate for the lost resources.  The extent of these impacts has not been established 
empirically.  
However, PILOTs have many disadvantages.  They generate some much needed 
revenue for local governments, but considering their ad-hoc and short-term nature, as 
well as the conflict associated with any arrangement, they do not appear to hold the key 
to resolving long-term issues.  Another more transparent and predictable tool for 
compensation for provided services is fees for services.  There has been a general 
increase in the use of fees by local governments.  However, the extent to which 
nonprofits contribute to some of these fees is not clear.  
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Future research on PILOTs should focus on understanding the extent of their use, 
the stability of the revenue generated from such arrangements, the costs to local 
governments of implementing them, and the cost to nonprofit organizations in terms of 
revenue that can be used for community services.  Another interesting question is 
whether nonprofit organizations can shift the cost of PILOTs or fees to their customers, 
and therefore distribute across localities the burden of the tax exemption. The main 
obstacle in the current research has been the availability of data, particularly data beyond 
the case studies frequently discussed in reports.  
 
5. Direct Subsidies by Local Governments 
 
In addition to the implicit subsidy provided by the property tax exemption, local 
governments have provided discretionary subsidies to nonprofit organizations in order to 
influence their location decision.  There is no systematic account of the extent of those 
subsidies but they are illustrated by several relocation examples from the media.  Bixler 
(2006) in the Atlanta Journal Constitution reports that the City of Atlanta provided some 
financial incentives to Habitat for Humanity for its move of part of its headquarter 
operation from Plains, Georgia to Atlanta.  The American Cancer Society was provided 
with incentive financed by a local foundation to locate in downtown Atlanta (Saporta and 
Woods 2006).  In 2006, Orlando, Florida won a bid to attract a nonprofit medical 
research institute with a $310 million incentive package (Hundley 2006).  A similar 
incentive package, including donated land, was put together for a medical research center 
  
 
30
affiliated with Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio (Pramik, 2005).  And, Orlando 
provided 165 acres of land, for free, to the Campus Crusade for Christ in exchange for 
establishing its World Center for Discipleship and Evangelism in Orlando (Allman 2007).  
Government incentives include land donations, infrastructure improvements around new 
developments, and packages to cover relocation costs.  
 These examples appear to contradict the story that was told so far, one of tension 
between local government and nonprofit organizations over the forgone revenues from 
property taxes.  However, they highlight the nature of the issues underlying the property 
tax exemption – that nonprofit organizations benefit the community with their activity 
and exemption and subsidies are necessary to sustain such activity. Future research might 
attempt to catalogue instances of local governments providing economic incentives to 
nonprofits to locate in the jurisdiction.  It would also be of interest to determine what 
factors are associated with a decision to provide an incentive, for example, whether local 
governments that offer such direct subsidies have different revenue patterns than those 
challenging nonprofit exemptions.  
 
6. Conclusion: Why it matters and to whom – the relative importance of expanding 
our knowledge to practitioners, policy-makers, and scholars 
 
The property tax is a significant revenue source for local governments that over time has 
been gradually eroded by popular tax revolts.  At the same time, the nonprofit sector has 
become key in the provision of public goods and services, and tax exemptions are 
defended as appropriate subsidies for these activities.  However, the link between the 
  
 
31
beneficiaries of the services and their location has become less obvious as technological 
advances have decreased the importance of physical distance.  As a result of all these 
changes, the property tax exemption has been an issue of interest to local governments, 
nonprofit organizations, and scholars for quite some time and will continue to be an 
important policy issue.   
There are significant theoretical and empirical gaps to be addressed by future 
research.  Policy makers need to know more about the revenues forgone from the 
exemption, about the advantages and disadvantages of PILOTs and other solutions for 
distributing more evenly the burden of the property tax exemption.  Scholars need to 
improve their understanding of the economic effects of the property tax exemption by 
examining further the behavior of nonprofit organizations, both theoretically and 
empirically.  It is not clear to what extent differences in property taxes determine the mix 
of for-profit and nonprofit organizations, and the quantity and quality of services 
produced by nonprofit organizations.  Furthermore, broadly defined exemption criteria 
may result in different treatment of otherwise similar organizations, but the extent of this 
has not been documented yet.  
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Table 1. Criteria for Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations  
 
Ownership vs. Use   
Nonprofit ownership only no states  
Exempt use only 11 states AR, CT, GA, IA, MS, NV, NH, NM, OH, OK, WV 
Nonprofit ownership and exempt use 39 states all except the states identified above 
Property leased to a nonprofit is exempt 17 states AK, AR, HI, IA, ID, LA, MA, MD, MN,MT, NM, NV, OK, OR, RI, SC, UT 
Property leased to a nonprofit is not exempt 31 states AL, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, IL, KS, KY, ME, MI, MS, MO, NE, NH, 
NJ, NY, NC, ND, OH, PA, SD, TX, VT, VA, WA, WV, WI, WY 
Nonprofit property leased to a for-profit 
organization is assessed separately  
31 states AK, AR, CO, CT, DE, FL, HI, IA, IN, KY, LA, MA, ME, MI, MO, MT, NC, 
ND, NE, NJ, NH, NM, NY, OR, PA, SC, SD, TX, UT, VA, WI 
Property is not split, assessment varies by states 16 states AL, AR, CA, GA, ID, KS, MD, MS, NV, OH, OK, TN, VT, WA, WV, WY 
   
Definition of charity used to grant  
exemption status 
  
Organized as nonprofit corporation yes: 36 states  
 no: 7 states  
Pursue charitable purpose yes: 45 states  
 no: 1 state  
Relieve government of burden yes: 19 states  
 no: 21 states  
Derive most of its income from donations yes: 14 states  
 no: 23 states  
Provide public benefit yes: 38 states  
 no: 7 states  
Donate a substantial portion of its services yes: 15 states  
 no: 22 states  
Provide services to all yes: 24 states  
 no: 13 states  
 
  
Source: Bowman (2002) 
 
